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Abstract
There have been outsourcing and insourcing trends for decades. Most often benefits 
and costs of outsourcing are compared from the purely financial side. However, risks 
are those that eventually determine whether a particular product/service/asset should 
be outsourced or not. The aim of this chapter is to fill in the gap in the literature by 
analysing risk-reward or benefit-cost ratio in outsourcing decisions for services in the 
public and private sector. After comparing the process of strategic decision-making and 
pros and cons of outsourcing between the private and the public sector, a general rule 
of thumb is developed as a guideline for outsourcing decisions. The decision-making 
tree for outsourcing decisions is applicable to both typical outsourced services and out-
sourcing the implementation of complex projects. As a rule, the more complicated the 
service, the greater the chance of outsourcing. However, greater complexity of services 
is usually accompanied with higher risks, like in energy performance or public-private 
partnerships. Whenever the contract is not well prepared, outsourcing may not achieve 
the expected benefits and may enhance the costs and risks. Although some very specific 
cases cannot be generalised, the similarities in decision-making behaviour can be taken 
as guidance when opting for outsourcing possibilities.
Keywords: outsourcing decision, public procurement, public-private partnership, 
energy performance contracting
1. Introduction
Outsourcing is defined as the procurement of products or services from sources that are exter-
nal to the organisation [17]. It does not matter who owns the organisation or what is the size 
of the organisation. The organisations cannot do business alone, so each organisation uses 
outsourcing whenever contracting external parties to deliver a product or service. Companies 
have always tried to make up for the resources or references they do not have by engaging into 
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different types of arrangements with those private entities that could help them. Outsourcing 
is done even before a certain contract is awarded. The whole subcontracting procedure in 
(public) tenders can be considered as an outsourcing activity. Companies subcontract and 
engage into consortia to make up for the insufficient financial or operational capabilities (staff 
qualifications, technology and/or other physical resources). Outsourcing can also be done by 
creating equity partnerships like equity joint ventures or statutory public-private partnership 
agreements. Holweg and Pil [10] distinguish fee-for-service outsourcing and establishing a 
new, wholly or partially owned, enterprise, by outsourcing entity to take on the activities that 
are externalised (enterprise partnership).
The advantages of outsourcing can be operational, strategic or combined. It can be added 
that the advantage of outsourcing is ultimately financial. Expected cost savings arising from 
outsourcing tend to be mitigated by monitoring costs when the outsourced service is complex 
and requires constant quality control. The theory of outsourcing complex products is very 
well illustrated by Brown et al. [6]. Operational advantages usually provide for short-term 
trouble avoidance, while strategic advantages offer long-term contributions in maximising 
opportunities [17]. The prime reasons to outsource are lack of internal competencies, focus 
on core business, lower costs and greater flexibility. Outsourcing can also be interpreted as 
accelerating a business change (business restructuring). Outsourcing in general keeps fixed 
costs (of staff and/or technology) lower and controls the risks of goods or services availability 
on time and on budget. When considered from the point of flexibility (moving CAPEX into 
OPEX) and elasticity (capacity to expand or reduce the activities), outsourcing is all about the 
rental of technology (including leasing contracts) or external staff with certain competencies 
(contracted workforce). The portfolio of leased assets in Europe steadily grows each year and 
it reached 779.1 billion euro at the end of 2016 [16] which is a good guidance on outsourcing 
market growth. However, leasing contracts have traditionally been perceived as a financing 
option only. When the government wants to maintain public ownership of essential assets 
and transfers the responsibility for managing the assets to the private sector, it is called public 
sector outsourcing [11].
The goal of this chapter is to compare decision-making rules for contracting out services in 
the public and in the private sector, to compare the market size of outsourcing and to warn 
on proper preparation process before contracting out complex services. The chapter consists 
of five parts. After the introductory section, Section 2 deals with outsourcing market size 
development. In Section 3, a decision-making tree for contracting out in both the private 
and the public sectors has been developed. Section 4 deals with outsourcing complex con-
tracts such as public-private partnerships and energy performance contracts and Section 5 
concludes.
2. Outsourcing market size development
According to Statista [23], global market size of outsourcing steadily grows each year. It climbed 
from 45.6 billion USD to 88.9 billion USD from 2000 to 2017. Information technology (IT) and 
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business process (BP) outsourcing as well as outsourcing industry revenue estimates at the global 
level are shown in Figure 1. Although these data cannot be taken as accurate as there are differ-
ent statistics related to outsourcing, they represent a rough indication of outsourcing market size 
and its development. IT outsourcing is twice as larger as other business processes outsourcing. 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region has the largest share in outsourcing industry 
revenue that exceeds the combined outsourcing industry revenue in Americas, Asia and Pacific.
Outsourcing market can be considered from the private and from the public sector’s stance. 
According to Kircher [13], outsourcing of production of goods or services by private compa-
nies within the EU is most frequent in Finland (53% of overall activities). Nordic countries 
take a lead together with Portugal whose companies contract out 41% of their production or 
services. EU-28 average of private sector outsourcing is 27%, whereas least outsourcing prone 
countries are Croatia (15%) and Ireland (16%).
Government to business market within the EU is huge, with Germany, France, UK, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden at the lead. These seven countries account for more than 80% 
of total public procurement value in EU-28. Table 1 shows the market size in absolute and rel-
ative numbers per member countries. While the EU average for public procurement share in 
GDP is 13.8%, in some countries, government consumption climbs over 15% of GDP (yellow 
shade in Table 1). Government consumption is in some countries bound to the pan-European 
institutions’ presence (Luxembourg and Belgium) and to the overall size of the central and 
local government. In general, the larger the value of contracting between the government 
and the private sector, the higher the proportion of outsourcing public services to the private 
sector. Hence, the more efficient public administration should be if the public procurement 
contracts are structured the right way and awarded according to the prevailing qualitative 
criteria, and if government employment is under controllable levels.
Figure 1. Global outsourcing industry, 2010–2016, in billions USD. Source: Statista [23].
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Country name 2012 2013 2014 2015 Mean 
market 
size 
2012–2015
Mean 
% share 
in GDP 
2012–2015
Expenditure on 
government outsourcing 
as % of GDP 2014*
Goods and 
services 
used
Goods and 
services 
financed
Germany 408.7 425.5 442.0 461.7 434.5 15.1 4+ 8
France 313.5 318.6 317.0 317.2 316.6 14.9 5 6
UK 290.3 285.4 312.6 349.7 309.5 13.9 11 0
Italy 171.7 171.6 169.2 170.3 170.7 10.5 6 2
Netherlands 134.8 133.9 134.9 135.6 134.8 20.4 6+ 10+
Spain 113.0 105.9 104.9 111.4 108.8 10.4 5+ 2+
Sweden 69.3 71.8 70.8 72.1 71.0 16.3 8 2+
Belgium 56.8 57.1 58.7 59.5 58.0 14.6 4 8
Poland 48.4 47.4 51.5 52.1 49.9 12.3 6 2
Austria 41.1 42.5 43.4 45.2 43.1 13.2 7 4+
Denmark 37.6 37.3 38.3 38.7 38.0 14.7 9 1+
Finland 35.8 37.4 37.7 37.0 37.0 18.2 12 2+
Czechia 22.2 21.4 21.5 24.2 22.3 13.9 5 6
Greece 20.0 19.0 18.9 19.0 19.2 10.6 4+ 3
Portugal 17.2 16.6 17.0 17.7 17.1 9.9 6 2
Ireland 17.0 16.5 18.0 18.3 17.5 8.8 4+ 0
Romania 15.6 16.2 16.4 18.7 16.7 11.3
Hungary 13.1 14.3 16.2 17.3 15.2 14.7 8 2
Slovakia 9.9 10.1 10.9 13.4 11.1 14.7 5+ 5
Croatia 5.7 6.0 6.0 5.7 5.9 13.5
Luxembourg 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.3 5.9 12.3 4
Slovenia 4.7 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.0 13.5 7 2
Bulgaria 4.5 4.9 5.5 6.2 5.3 12.2
Lithuania 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.7 10.4
Latvia 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.8 11.9 6 1
Estonia 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.7 14.1 7 2
Cyprus 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 6.0
Malta 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8 10.6
Total 1867.4 1880.6 1933.4 2014.2 1923.9 13.8
*Source: European Commission [15, 18].
Table 1. Government to business market (public procurement contracts value) in EU-28 in billion USD.
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The value of public procurement is in general larger than the value of outsourcing of the pub-
lic sector. Total outsourcing reached 8.7% of GDP in 2015 on average among the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Therefore, governments pro-
vide outsourcing market value of at least 1.2 trillion USD each year that is considerably higher 
than business-to-business (B2B) outsourcing. In other words, governments create the largest 
outsourcing market in the world by public procurement of goods and services.
Outsourcing of public sector activities can take place in two ways. Governments can either 
purchase goods and services to be used as inputs, or they can pay a non-profit or private entity 
to provide the goods and services directly to the end user. Last two columns of Table 1 repre-
sent outsourcing decisions of the governments of OECD countries only [5]. Complex projects 
such as bridges, highways and other major public works typically undergo many revisions and 
changes throughout the course of construction. One-third of the items experiences changes that 
alter the amount of work by more than 25% [19]. Contractual incompleteness lead to 15–27% 
subcontracting cost increase for the change in quantity of contracted works of up to 35% [19].
Complex outsourcing contracts, such as public-private partnerships, represent only a small 
part of the EU public budget. These financial instruments have been heavily promoted due to 
budgetary and efficiency reasons, but they require contracting capabilities of the public sector 
and well-defined public sector needs before entering into such contracts. Otherwise, public 
sector ends paying the assets/service it does not need for many years ahead.
Both the value and the number of publi-private partnership (PPP) contracts are on decrease. 
Compared to the year 2000 when there were 306.5 billion USD public-private partnership 
contracts across the EU and 1563 of the projects, in 2015, the value of PPP contracts declined 
to only 27.6 billion USD, whereas the number of projects was only 118. Figure 2 depicts an 
11-fold decline in value and a 13-fold decrease in the number of projects. Interestingly, PPPs 
in the UK are not considered as PPPs in the European context as PPP contracts are consid-
ered as private finance initiative in this country.1 The largest number of PPP projects in other 
EU states has been implemented in transport (more than 50% on average). Healthcare and 
education accounted together for about 25% stake in total value of the projects; environment 
protection stood in the fourth place with 6–8% stake in total project value. Despite most EU 
governments have deficits, only several countries engage into complex long-term contracts 
such as PPPs. They are primarily France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Ireland and Greece. These data should be monitored combined with the data on 
concessions (which are not available at the pan-European level) and the data on energy per-
formance contracts. The reason for inclusion of the latter is that there are no energy efficiency 
projects contracted as PPPs in EPEC’s PPP statistics from 2000 to 2015. The adoption of the 
Directive on energy efficiency [7] that defined and encouraged energy performance contract-
ing in EU member states to achieve Europe’s 2020 goals, that is, 20% lower greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions than in 1990s, 20% electricity production from the renewables and energy 
efficiency increase by 20% until 2020 [8]. The total EU Energy Service Company (ESCO) mar-
ket has been estimated at 2.4 billion euro revenue in 2015 [4]. Again, this is only an additional 
1At the end of 2016, there have been 59.4 billion GBP operational PFI projects in the UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/private-finance-initiative-and-private-finance-2-projects-2016-summary-data
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confirmation that the public sector keeps trying to avoid fiscal barriers in implementing capital 
infrastructural projects with shortened time horizons of repaying the capital and other costs 
of the investments during the contract term. Besides, contracting EPC contracts can include 
energy supply contracts, shared savings contracts and other variants that can encourage the 
participation of the private sector in delivering energy-efficient infrastructural solutions.
3. Making decisions on outsourcing
Most frequently outsourced services are IT, legal, tax, accounting, finance, (digital) marketing 
and sale, procurement, customer care and call centres, intellectual property protection, proj-
ect management, research and development and other business processes. The decisions on 
outsourcing vary depending on the following factors:
• Size of the organisation (the greater the number of employees, the less likely outsourcing of 
some business processes such as human resources, accounting, legal advisory).
• Type of the organisation and the origin of its revenues and costs (public organisations have 
estimated budgetary revenues. The higher the revenues they get from the public budget, 
the more likely that they would constantly outsource all activities. In times of budgetary 
contraction, only necessary services and goods are contracted out to the private sector. If 
there are no funds and there is a clear responsibility towards the public to have an opera-
tional infrastructure, engagement into more complex outsourcing contracts is more likely. 
The private sector earns revenues in the market, and hence, its outsourcing decisions are 
Figure 2. PPP contracts by value in billion USD and number of projects. Source: European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC).
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more dependent on the expectations of their end users and the moves of their competition. 
If the competition has a service that is difficult, costly or slow to develop, then it needs to 
be bought regardless of its costs to keep the company in the market play).
• Type of business (manufacturing organisations are more likely to outsource business pro-
cesses related to product/goods transport or delivery, manufacturing of some parts that do 
not hide intellectual property secrets or some administrative functions. Some manufactur-
ing companies may engage into collaborative projects with research institutions to develop 
prototypes of future products or services. Service companies do not require a large portion 
of capital employed, and hence, they are more flexible in outsourcing certain business pro-
cesses. For trade or personal secret sensitive outsourcing, a background national regulation 
of the country in which outsourcing is to be placed is required. Globally present companies 
are more likely to outsource certain business processes as they never have all processes in 
one place and decide to outsource based on the lowest cost principle (including lower tax).
• Integration of to be outsourced activities with the core business (the greater the integration 
of the activity into business processes, the less likely is the decision on outsourcing. Even 
relative simple activities can be classified as complex if they influence health, safety, secu-
rity or personal data or environment protection).
• Possibility to build inside competences versus buying them on contract (it is all about ‘hire 
or fire’ decision related to the employees and technology. Even if technology purchase can 
be afforded, are there sufficient competences to make use of it?
• Fixed versus variable costs and related flexibility (outsourcing gives flexibility to the or-
ganisations, enabling them better growth chance. Organisations that engage into loans to 
finance fixed costs are not prone to risk as they have fixed obligations to fulfil on a monthly 
basis. By moving CAPEX to OPEX, both financing and operational restructuring can be 
done. The service is there when needed and paid only when needed and used.
• Postponement of the obligations is like flexibility, but with different motive (even if out-
sourcing does not provide lower costs, time value of money often prevails in such deci-
sions. If equipment is needed and it is too much to pay it at once, companies consider 
operational leasing that also enables them technology change after the end of the contract. 
In other words, the whole set of activities related to obsolete technology (whom to sell, at 
what price, how and where to decommission it are transferred to the lease companies).
Figure 3 illustrates a decision-making tree in outsourcing. It starts with a dilemma on whether 
to outsource or not and what to outsource. After the identification of what to outsource, there 
is a set of check questions on the reason behind the outsourcing decision. The most frequent 
reasons to outsource are numbered, starting from the focus on core business over lower costs 
and higher efficiency, lack of internal competence and greater flexibility. If the reason behind 
the outsourcing decision is concentrating on core business, then the question is to what extent 
the business process to be outsourced overlaps with the core business. This question also con-
siders intellectual property protection, if there is such. The more complex the process/activity 
to be outsourced, the higher the costs of outsourcing. Hence, outsourcing should not be done, 
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especially if there is an in-house workforce capacity to perform such business process. The 
questions on outsourcing encompass also the questions on financial capacity and operational/
business restructuring. Probably, the simplest decision on outsourcing is flexibility as it requires 
answering only one question on whether greater flexibility is worth the costs.
The analysis conducted by Tadelis and Bajari [22] suggests that for long-term and steady pro-
vision, goods and services that are simple to contract should be outsourced with fixed-price 
contracts. Unlike them, complex goods and services should be internally produced as if they 
are procured with a cost-plus contract. In the latter case, the benefits of internal production are 
that the procurer retains the control over the process and flexibility. Kim and Brown [12] distin-
guish between simple and complex products. According to them, simple products encompass 
auditing, court reporting, janitorial service, landscaping, laundry and dry-cleaning, equipment 
maintenance and repair, security guard and patrol, solid waste collection and warehousing 
and storage. Complex products include advertising, computer systems development services, 
engineering, legal service, logistics support, professional and management training, pro-
gramme management and support services and programme review and development services.
4. Estimating risk: reward in outsourcing complex contracts
Public procurement or government to business (G2B) market has been considered the larg-
est outsourcing market with between 15 and 20% of EU GDP or 1.3 trillion euro spent each 
year [14]. Effective contracting promises win-win exchanges, and markets are most likely to 
produce win-win outcomes when buyers and sellers can easily define and verify product 
Figure 3. Decision-making tree in outsourcing. Source: Adapted according to Grubišić Šeba [9].
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cost, quality and quantities. When markets fail, the win-win outcomes are replaced by lose-
lose or win-lose outcomes where the winner’s gains are greater than the loser’s losses. Unlike 
simple products, the cost, quality and quantity parameters of complex products cannot be 
easily defined or verified, leaving buyers and sellers unable to clearly and completely define 
exchange terms [1]. Outsourcing complex assets or services delivery to the private sector has 
widely been known under different modalities of public-private initiative. While an extreme 
part of such outsourcing contracts is called sale or privatisation of once government assets or 
business, the mixed solutions that provide different ratios of public or private influence for 
a certain period are known as public-private partnership options, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
Contracting out needs to be considered whenever the government entity cannot take advan-
tage of the economies of scale or scope, whereby it can be done either to the private or to the 
public sector. In other words, contracting out government services will neither reduce gov-
ernment outlays nor increase government efficiency unless decision makes economic sense 
[21]. Public-private partnership contracts outsource one or more of the following activities to 
the private sector: financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance. Such contracts 
are considered complex as each outsourced activity encompasses a few subactivities such 
as risk and responsibility transfer, employment of certain number of staff with designated 
competencies, avoidance of numerous public procurements for goods or service delivery and 
achievement of certain performance standards (quality of service). In other words, the entire 
set of the outsourced subactivities is known as know-how of the private partner which is 
expected to bring value for money to the public partner over the term of the contract.
Purely seen from the perspective of the traditional public procurement, complex outsourcing 
contracts such as public-private partnerships outsource public activities to the private part-
ner for a certain period of time. The public partner in such contracts in fact combines a few 
usually separately publicly procured services into a single public procurement procedure. 
No wonder that such tenders are not governed under public procurement law, but under 
a more stringent law, that is, public-private partnership law. In addition, the project pre-
paredness must be better, the procurement procedure is longer, often there are negotiations 
with interested prequalified private partners known as a competitive dialogue procedure in 
which prequalified bidders try to convince the public partner that they are the one to contract 
with, the contract must be approved and monitored by the governing institution such as the 
Ministry of finance or Public-private partnership agency. Public-private partnerships have 
been popularised within the new public management wave in the context of saving public 
budget, that is, achieving greater efficiency at lower costs [3].
It is often claimed that the project implementation is as good as its preparation. Hence, it is no 
wonder that complex projects are prepared years before public tenders are announced. Even 
though it is hard to calculate value for money in public-private partnership contracts as it not 
only consists of a financial part, more and more regulators require calculating public sector 
comparator before making decisions whether to perform a certain project via the traditional 
public procurement procedure or to engage into public-private partnership contract. The key is 
monetising some non-financial risks and benefits and comparing them with the calculations on 
the resources required to implement a project under the traditional public procurement proce-
dure. The precondition for accurate calculations is setting good assumptions on traditional pub-
lic procurement costs and time, as well as internal staff and resources necessary to implement 
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a project in a quality way, on time and on budget. If there are internal resources to implement 
the project and financial capacity of the public authority is not sufficient, there are numerous 
variants of public-private partnerships to consider apart from the most often mentioned turn-
key solution which includes design, build, finance, maintain and operate model. Public-private 
partnership contracts may not be signed for the maximum period of 30 or 40 years, they may be 
signed for some activities only such as design, financing and construction, or design, finance, 
construction and maintenance, while the operation of the asset can be entrusted to the public 
partner. Even in complex contracts, a public partner shall go through the decision-making tree 
and consider other options of asset or services delivery. The starting point in answering ques-
tions in the decision tree is defining a desired capacity of an infrastructural assets and qual-
ity of service, current and projected public budget, current and expected internal resources, 
the expected revenues and costs (not only from the budget) after the assets/service becomes 
operational. In other words, the public sector needs to determine what internal resources and 
budget they have, what and when they (the citizens) want to have, what is the quality of the 
asset or service the citizens want to have, to what extent the project can be completed with own 
resources and to what extent contracting out to the private sector would be most feasible.
Making decisions on energy performance contracts resembles engaging into public-private part-
nership contracts, even though the energy performance contracts are considered much simpler. 
Two paramount reasons are shorter duration of the contract and no impact on the public budget 
increase. Energy performance contracts contain guaranteed energy savings that oblige public 
partner to pay for them only after they are achieved, shifting the whole energy performance 
risk to the private partner. All the costs of the private partner are paid periodically, that is, over 
the time of the contract, if the contracted savings are accomplished, and the size of the monthly/
annual bills has its cap in the size of the bills before project implementation. In other words, 
achieved savings after new project implementation should be sufficient to pay off the capital 
costs of the investment and other costs (fees) of the private partner without increasing the public 
budget over the contract term. No matter what a certain model of contracting is called, Table 2 
should help distinguish between complex and simple contracts. The more freedom is given to 
the parties in contracting, the more complex the contract. Good contracts require sound internal 
or external staff competencies to define risk-reward ratio acceptable to other parties. Otherwise, 
complex contracts become a subject of public critics and negative perceptions of the public.
While reward of the private partner in complex contracts relates to financial and reputa-
tional benefits, the risk-reward ratio of the public sector is not so simple. Table 3 tries to 
Figure 4. Illustration of the variety on public-private partnership contracts. Source: PPIAF [20].
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illustrate typical risks and rewards to which the public and the private partners are exposed 
to in complex outsourcing contracts, such as are public-private partnership contracts. Energy 
performance contracts are also considered as complex contracts, which, unlike public-private 
partnership contracts, do not require extra budget of the public partner.
Feature of the contract Public-private 
partnership
Energy performance 
contracting
Long-term nature of the project Yes Yes
Risk-reward ratio If contracted Yes
Performance-based/quality of service contracting If contracted Yes
Different stages of project implementation included Yes Yes
Stakeholders presence Yes Yes
Occasional adjustment of the contract to market condition If contracted If contracted
Source: Author.
Table 2. Common features of complex contracts.
Project phase Private partner Public partner
Risk Reward Risk Reward
Design No Fee Yes, it should 
define what is 
wanted
A well-designed object in accordance 
with public needs
Finance No Coverage of all the 
costs of borrowing 
plus guaranteed rate of 
return over the contract
Yes Off-balance sheet accounting, no 
immediate financial outflow
Construction Performance on 
time and on budget 
if defined so
Guaranteed fee/
reputational benefit
No, apart from 
obtaining 
certain permits 
on time and 
risks related 
to location 
selection
Avoidance of multiple public 
procurement procedures for 
contacting works or services, no need 
to engage plenty of internal staff in 
preparing and monitoring certain 
project phases; know-how of the 
private partner
Maintenance Fixed costs of staff 
and variable costs 
of replacement 
parts
A right to exploit an 
object on your own if 
contracted so with the 
public partner
No The object in good condition is there 
when needed
Operation Fixed costs of staff, 
electricity, water, 
heating, cleaning
Guaranteed fee/
reputational benefit
No, if quality 
of service is 
contracted
No need for employment of extra 
staff; good reputation of the public 
partner among stakeholders
Transfer Overhauls Reputation No, accepts 
the object if 
everything is 
functional
Can decide whether to continue 
operating it on its own or to outsource 
operation and maintenance, that is, 
should prepare exit strategy
Source: Author.
Table 3. Risk-reward between public and private partners in complex outsourcing contracts.
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Table 3 also shows that the extent of reward to the public partner after engaging into complex 
contracts is mostly dependent on the public partner’s capability to anticipate and balance 
between budgetary outlays, satisfaction of the end users and internal resources needed for 
contract implementation and monitoring.
The benefits of outsourcing complex contracts can be huge, but the huge can be the costs if 
the contracts are not balanced as well. In general, all the disadvantages of engaging into the 
complex contracts are the same as engaging into simple outsourcing contracts. They are nicely 
noted by Barthélemy [2] who called them seven sins of outsourcing: (1) outsource activities 
that should not be outsourced; (2) select the wrong vendor (private partner); (3) write a poor 
contract; (4) overlook personnel issues; (5) lose control over the outsourced activity; (6) over-
look the hidden costs of outsourcing and (7) fail to plan an exit strategy. These can also be taken 
as precautionary measures before making outsourcing decisions and whenever evaluating 
whether outsourcing has been a good decision, regardless of the complexity of outsourcing 
contracts.
5. Conclusion
This chapter deals with outsourcing rules in the private and the public sectors as well as 
with the features of complex outsourcing contracts. Outsourcing activities are usually linked 
to the private sector organisations. Yet, contracting out is even more important within the 
public sector as the public procurement market represents the largest outsourcing market in 
the world. Making decisions on outsourcing can mostly follow the same path regardless of 
whether public or private organisation implements it. Hence, a decision-making tree on out-
sourcing is presented. It considers four most frequent reasons to outsource including: focus 
on core business, lower costs and higher efficiency, lack of internal competencies and greater 
quality of service and greater flexibility.
Complex activities (projects to be implemented) are usually outsourced to lesser or greater 
extent. However, engaging into complex contracts has often not been considered an out-
sourcing, but financing decision. However, such contracts should not be considered from 
the financial stance only, but from the stance of the quality of contract. Complex contracts 
should make up for the internal (not only financial) resources, simplify multiple public 
procurement procedures and achieve better quality of service provided to the end users 
(stakeholders).
Author details
Mihaela Grubišić Šeba
Address all correspondence to: mihaela.g.seba@gmail.com
Independent Senior Consultant and Research Associate, Self-Employed at BizVision d.o.o. 
for Business Advisory, Zagreb, Croatia
Positive and Negative Aspects of Outsourcing104
References
[1] Bajari P, Tadelis S. Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of procurement con-
tracts. RAND Journal of Economics. 2001;32:387-407
[2] Barthélemy J. The seven deadly sins of outsourcing. Academy of Management Executive. 
2003;17(2):87-98
[3] Batran A, Essig M, Schaefer B. Chapter 8: Public Private Partnerships as an Element of Public 
Procurement Reform in Germany. In: Knight L, Harland C, Telqen J, Thai KV, Callender G, 
McKen K, editors. Public Procurement – International Cases and Commentary. New York: 
Pracademic Press; 2005. pp. 127-149
[4] Boza-Kiss B, Bertoldi P, Economidou M. Energy Service Companies in the EU, European 
Commission. JRC Science for Policy Report. 2017. Available from: http://publications.jrc.
ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC106624/kjna28716enn.pdf
[5] Boyle R. Public Sector Trends 2015, State of the Public Service Series, Research Paper No 
17. Institute of Public Administration; 2015. Available from: https://www.ipa.ie/_fileUp-
load/Documents/PublicSectorTrends2015.pdf
[6] Brown TL, Potoski M, Van Slyke DM. Contracting for complex products. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART. 2010;20(supplement 1: The State 
of Agents: A Special Issue):141-158
[7] Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 
on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing 
Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L 315/1. 
Nov 14, 2012. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:32012L0027&from=EN
[8] European Commission. Communication from the Commission Europe 2020—A Strategy 
for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, Brussels 3.3.2010, COM(2010) 2020. 2010. 
Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20
%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf
[9] Grubišić Šeba M. In: Musa A, editor. Outsourcing javnih usluga/Outsourcing Public 
Services, 7. Forum za javnu upravu: Od javnog prema privatnom—privatizacija i out-
sourcing javnih usluga. Zagreb: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung: Institut za javnu upravu; 2014. 
pp. 27-52
[10] Holweg M, Pil FK. Outsourcing Complex Business Processes: Lessons from an Enterprise 
Partnership. Vol. 54(3). University of California, Berkeley: California Management Review; 
2012. pp. 98-115
[11] Jensen PH, Stonecash RE. The Efficiency of Public Sector Outsourcing Contracts: A 
Literature Review. Melbourne Institute Working Paper No. 29/04. 2004. Available 
from: http://melbourneinstitute.unimelb.edu.au/downloads/working_paper_series/
wp2004n29.pdf
Outsourcing Rules in the Public and the Private Sector
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75869
105
[12] Kim JW, Brown TL. The importance of contract design. Public Administration Review. 
2012;72(5):687-696
[13] Kircher S. Who performs outsourcing? A cross-national comparison pf companies in 
the EU-28. In: Drahokoupil J, editor. The Outsourcing Challenge—Organizing Workers 
across Fragmented Production Networks. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute; 
2015. pp. 25-45
[14] European Commission. Public Procurement. 2018. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/
growth/single-market/public-procurement_en
[15] European Commission. Public Procurement Indicators 2015—DG Growth G4—Innovative 
and e-Procurement. 2016. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/ 
20679
[16] LeaseEurope. The Voice of Leasing and Automotive Rental in Europe, Annual Survey. 2016. 
http://www.leaseurope.org/uploads/documents/stats/European%20Leasing%20Market%20
2016.pdf
[17] Lankford WM, Parsa F. Outsourcing: A primer. Management Decision. 1999;37(4):310-316. 
Available from: http://gibs-mba-entrepreneurship.pbworks.com/f/2-Outsourcing%2Ba% 
2BPrimer.pdf
[18] The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Government 
at a Glance, 2017. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4217001e.pdf?exp
ires=1519902634&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=04776AEC19A8837E738FB3617CF
BAFA7
[19] Miller DP. Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement con-
tracts. RAND Journal of Economics. 2014;45(4):705-746
[20] PPIAF. Main types of Public Private Partnerships. New York: United States of America 
by Cambridge University Press; 2009. Available from: https://ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/
files/documents/toolkits/highwaystoolkit/6/pdf-version/1-13.pdf
[21] Prager J. Contracting out government services: Lessons from the private sector. Public 
Administration Review. 1994;54(2):176-184
[22] Tadelis S, Bajari P. Incentives and award procedures: Competitive tendering vs. negotia-
tions in procurement. In: Dimitri, Piga, Spagnolo, editors. Handbook of Procurement. 
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press; 2006. http://assets.cambridge.
org/97805218/70733/frontmatter/9780521870733_frontmatter.pdf
[23] Statista. 2018. Available form: https://www.statista.com/statistics/189788/global-outsourcing- 
market-size/
Positive and Negative Aspects of Outsourcing106
